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Abstract People struggling with addiction are neither
powerless over their addiction, nor are they fully in con-
trol. Lewis vigorously objects to the brain diseasemodel of
addiction (BDMA), because it makes people lose belief in
their self-efficacy, and hence hinders their recovery. Al-
though he acknowledges that there is a compulsive state in
addiction, he objects to the claim that this compulsion is
carved in stone. Lewis argues that the BDMA underesti-
mates the agency of addicted people, and hence hinder
their recovery. Lewis’s work offers us a very much to be
welcomed neurobiology of recovery. It offers addicted
people a hopeful and respectful narrative for their recovery
that treats them as agents rather than as damaged brains.
However, I argue that overestimating people’s agency can
also result in people losing belief in their self-efficacy.
Lewis’s strong focus on the agency of addicted people
might not match their experiences of struggle, hence rein-
forcing their feelings of guilt when they fail to control their
use. I propose to replace the notion of addiction as a
disease with a notion of a disease-like stage in addiction.
I call this stage the duress stage in addiction, in which the
addictive behaviour is largely impervious to the agent’s
values and to available techniques of self-control.
However, the agent can overcome this stage by developing
new techniques of self-control, by building on their self-
concept and belief in self-efficacy, by changing their envi-
ronments and habits, and by engaging in projects that are
meaningful to the agent.
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How to Recover from a ‘Brain Disease’?
Lewis provocatively subtitles his book: ‘Why addiction is
not a disease’ [1]. He especially seems to object to the
brain disease model of addiction (BDMA). The BDMA
consists of three parts. The first part is a technical descrip-
tion of how repeated substance use influences brain chem-
istry. For example, there is how the dopamine released in
substance use influences attention and makes us highly
sensitive to substance-related cues. The second part con-
sists of normative claims (closely or less closely) based on
these described mechanisms. We have to, for example,
translate these mechanisms into human behaviour, into a
more normative and less technical language. Dopamine
release during substance use provides an extreme reward
and this leads to continued use, and eventually compul-
sive use. However, the BDMA also makes a normative
overarching conclusion on their findings: that addiction is
a chronic, relapsing brain disease. The third part, which is
closely related to the normative claims, consists of social
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alternative for the moral model of addiction, reducing
stigma, improving treatment.
Lewis claims that the aim of his book is to critically
examine the neuroscientific foundation of the disease
model. However, the neuroscientific mechanisms Lewis
describes as underlying addiction are largely in line with
the general consensus in this field. He acknowledges
that addiction involves harmful behaviour, and in some
parts of his book he even seems to support the view that
there is a compulsive stage in addiction.1 Lewis might
change an accent here or there in describing the neuro-
scientific mechanisms of addiction but he largely seems
to agree with the BDMA on the mechanisms described.
His main objection is to how the neuroscientific mech-
anisms are translated into normative statements. Lewis’s
main goal seems to be to show that the normative
conclusions of the BDMA do not follow logically from
the neuroscientific mechanisms described. The BDMA
proponents present their model as a logical outcome of
scientific research, but most of their conclusions are
normative and partly inspired by their scientific research
and partly by their social goals.
How we describe a phenomenon often depends on
what we are interested in. A nice meal my grandmother
made can be described in terms of cooking techniques or
in terms of family traditions, depending on what I am
mainly interested in. If we look at the historical setting in
which the BDMA was developed, we see that it was
developed to oppose simple choice models like the
moral model. The moral model claims that addicted
people are in control of their behaviour. The view on
human agency this model holds is that to understand
why people behave a certain way, we have to look at
what reasons they have to behave that way. Addicted
people find pleasure in use, or relief from pain, so they
act in a self-controlled way. This view on addiction has
led to stigmatisation of addicted people, and hinders
people when they seek treatment. The BDMA tried to
show that our behaviour is not only determined by
reasons, but also by causes [2]. Repeated substance
use changes our attention and our impulse control.
Hence, addicted behaviour is largely caused by sensiti-
sation to substance- related cues, and a dramatic reduc-
tion in cognitive control. The social goals of the BDMA
were to provide an alternative to the moral model of
addiction, to reduce stigma, and to stimulate people to
seek treatment. Hence, they overemphasised the
compulsive stage in addiction. In the most extreme
version of the BDMA, these social goals led to a view
on human agency of addicted persons determined by
causes, rather than reasons. The BDMA tries to explain
(against the moral model) why people at the height of
their addiction find it so hard to control their use (be-
cause their behaviour seems to be determined more by
cues than reasons).
Lewis however, has a different social goal in mind. His
main interest seems to be to understand recovery (rather
than explaining compulsion or involuntary behaviour in
addiction as the BDMA does), and from this focus he
approaches the complex phenomenon of addiction. His
vigorous attack on the BDMA’s normative claims is mo-
tivated by a social goal: to improve the chances of recov-
ery which he thinks the BDMA gets wrong; in fact he
thinks the BDMA hinders recovery. This does not mean
however that we should steer away from the neurobiology
of addiction, as most people tend to do [1, p.24]. Lewis
argues that based on the same neurological data we can
draw different normative conclusions, namely that addic-
tion is deep learning; a severe entrenched habit.
One can object that once we understand how addic-
tion works neurologically, we know how to treat it, but
as Lewis points out, although the BDMA had certain
hopes for recovery (reducing sigma, offering better
treatment through medicine that target brain mecha-
nisms), so far it has failed to fulfil those hopes. Addic-
tion cannot be diagnosed through brain scans, nor is it
treated with medicines (although medication can sup-
port treatment). Brain scans of addicted people have
very little prognostic value. This does not mean that
neuroscience is not important, only that it isn’t telling
the whole story.
Lewis is right, the BDMA is missing something im-
portant about recovery. It is not designed to describe
recovery. Miller has already argued that though animal
models are very useful for understanding how someone
gets trapped in addiction, there is no adequate animal
model of recovery.2 This is because animal models seem
to miss something important about human agency [3, p.
63].3 Lewis is a neuroscientist, he understands the animal
models, yet, he finds the strong focus on neuroscientific
explanations of addiction unsatisfactory, probably
1 Addiction is a habit that becomes compulsive [1, p.33].
2 An exception to this might be Alexander’s rat park study, although
one can argue whether this is a classical animal study.
3 Lewis’s book is a nice response to this impasse: he tries to describe a
neuroscience of recovery from addiction, instead of a neuroscience of
impairment.
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because from his own experience with recovery from
substance dependency he learned some important things
about human agency. So what has Lewis learned about
agency based on his own experiences with addiction?
Lewis’s Neurobiology of Recovery and Agency
Crucial to Lewis’s description of the neurobiology of
addiction and recovery is the relationship between the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), or what he calls the
bridge of the ship, and the striatum, or the motivational
engine. When people start using substances, the use
often has a positive effect on their lives: it helps them
to relax better in social situations, or to perform better at
work. Especially for people who struggle with unre-
solved childhood issues, issues they are sometimes even
not aware of, substance use can be highly effective. In
this stage, the dorsolateral PFC supports the use because
it solves a problem people don’t know how to solve
otherwise. What follows is a process of deep learning
that is similar to other processes of learning: we form a
habit fuelled by a desire. However, with substance use
this process goes faster than with other habit formations.
The habit becomes entrenched quickly. In this stage,
the dorsolateral PFC becomes partially discon-
nected from the striatum. The bridge of the ship
loses its command over the motivational engine.
(…) The reasons for this disconnection are com-
plex and not fully understood. But suffice it to say
that habits free themselves from higher-order con-
trols because the striatum no longer sends out
requests for prefrontal engagement’ [1, p.187].
Once this connection is distorted, ‘desire drives be-
haviour in small redundant circles, independent of in-
sight, perspective, and higher-order goals’ [1, 205].
So far Lewis’s description corresponds largely with
that of the neuroscience of addiction in general. However,
where neuroscience stays silent about how this discon-
nection can be restored, Lewis takes the analysis a step
further. Mostly people describe the role of the prefrontal
cortex within a dual processing model: as cognitive con-
trol, as willpower. However, just trying to control our use
will only hasten ego-depletion [4].4 Lewis however,
argues that there is a different way in which the dorsolat-
eral PFC can reconnect with the motivational engine.
As long as addiction is tolerated by the user, Lewis
argues, nothing happens, but when addiction is no longer
tolerated, people can actively try to reconnect with the
bridge of the ship. The way to do this is not to focus on
discontinuing use, but to imagine a valued future, and try
to make it accessible. We can try to shift our perspective
and attention rather than supress our urges [1, 158]. When
we do this, we can reconnect the motivational engines
with the bridge of the ship, and we can see the horizon
again [1, 192].5 In order to achieve this, Lewis sees an
important role for self-narrative and self-trust. ‘The ad-
dict’s life is lived in the tomb of the present, dead because
it has lost its connection with the story from which it
came’ [1, 205], Lewis argues. He cites for example a
study on suicide amongst native Americans. When native
American communities with a high suicide rate were
compared to those with a low suicide rate, it was found
that those more prone to suicide had no stories to tell
about their lives. When asked about their goals, their past,
their future, they had no narrative [5]. Lewis stresses the
importance of making sense of one’s own life, giving it
meaning and purpose.
It appears that Natalie and Brian began to outgrow
their addictions when they were able to reflect on
their lives, connect their past to their present co-
nundrum, and imagine a future very different from
the present. (…) As a result, they no longer had to
fight their impulses with the same exhausting
effort hour by hour and day by day. This greatly
reduced ego fatigue, which was the key to chang-
ing momentary behaviour and learning to rely on
top-down control. (…) They could detect a shift in
the course of their own personality development:
the emergence of new mental habits, new habit of
behaviour, and a different sense of who they were
as people. [1, p.201-2]
In the case studies he presents, redefining one’s iden-
tity and narrative plays an important role in recovery.
The people in his case studies examine which problems
in their lives they believe they could only solve with
substance use, and how they can address these problems
differently, mostly by redefining their identity and their
self-narrative.
4 the ego-depletion hypothesis is currently highly controversial follow-
ing the finding of a multi-lab preregistered trial that found that the
effect size was at best very small; [37]; see also [38].
5 Rather than trying to restore our synchronic self-control directly, we
can restore it indirectly by restoring our diachronic self-control.
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Brian had to fashion a story, a narrative, to explain
himself to himself. (…) Instead of seeing himself
as a classic victim of failed relationships, he began
to imagine that he was the kind of person who
could fix them, for others as well as himself. (…)
Pieces of a puzzle seemed to come together with
insight, luck, and time. (…) Brian emerged as
someone who could bring order to chaos, gather
the lost ones and help them find their way home.
This image of himself has grown from a daydream
to a burning commitment over the years since
then. [8, p.90-91]
So what is the BDMA missing about agency?
Traditionally there are two dominant views on hu-
man agency in addiction. The first view states that to
understand why people behave a certain way, we
have to look at their reasons: what’s in it for them?
These are the simple choice models of addiction.
The second view on human agency states that hu-
man behaviour is not only motivated by reasons, but
also by neurological, genetic or social causes [2,
p.471]. The BDMA focuses mostly on these causes
of behaviour. Lewis represent a third, less known
school that looks at the role of identity or self in
motivating behaviour [2, 6, 7]. We can exercise self-
control by exercising cognitive control, but we can
also exercise self-control by changing our self-con-
cept. As Lewis states in one of his case-studies:
‘Natalie had to find a self before she could find
self-control’ [1, p.67]. We estimate what others are
likely to do, based on what we know of their char-
acter and history: will my friend be on time, or will
she be late as usual? In the same way we make
estimations about ourselves based on our self-con-
cept. Our self-concept has a role in determining
what kinds of choices are presented to us internally,
as part of our character. Our self-concept determines
our motivation [8].
This view of Lewis on the importance of self-concept
and self-narrative in recovery is supported by research.
Biernacki for example wondered why some people
spontaneously recovered from heroin addiction. He
interviewed 101 ex-heroin users who quit their use
without professional intervention, and found that funda-
mental to their recovery was an identity change [9].
Many qualitative studies on recovery have since sup-
ported these findings [10–14]. There are also a few case
studies on narrative treatment that show promising
results [15–17]. The BDMA not only largely ignores
identity as a source of human agency, Lewis fears that
the message the BDMA sends will have a negative
effect on people’s self-concepts, and thus negatively
influence their recovery.
The Merits and Risks of Lewis’s Model
There are many merits to Lewis’s model of recovery. One
merit is that he connects what happens on an existential
level to what happens on a neurobiological level. He
explains how in changing our narrative, we can reconnect
our motivational engine with the bridge of the ship from
where we can see the horizon again. He offers a neurobi-
ological and existential account of recovery.
Maybe the largest merit of Lewis’s model is that he
offers a positive narrative on recovery. Most available
narratives on recovery represent substance users as dam-
aged goods. The current neuroscientific models espe-
cially are dominated by messages of long-term, even
irreparable damage to the brain. Most recovery narra-
tives are redemption stories in which the addicted person
realises he or she was wrong, and in which an effort was
made to try to restore some normality, while admitting
that their substance use may have damaged them irrep-
arably [18]. Lewis’s model provides us with a much
needed, positive narrative on recovery. Lewis offers an
alternative to the neuroscientific narrative of irreparable
damage to the brain. He cites a study on how greymatter
is restored after someone overcomes addiction [1, p.
137]. After six months to a year of abstinence, grey
matter returns to its normal baseline level. But as absti-
nence continues, the grey matter volumes keep increas-
ing, beyond the normal baseline levels of the controls
that have never been addicted. What is also remarkable
is that the regions in which the growth occurs do not
exactly correspond with the regions that were depleted
[19]. In overcoming one’s addiction, people don’t return
to their old state, but they have learned new things, they
have grown. Lewis objects to the word ‘recovery’ be-
cause it suggests that something is repaired, and it
suggests that a person has returned to a status quo, but
in his developmental perspective, a person has grown.
Lewis’s model is especially positive for people with
comorbid mental illness. This group is often presented as
having the worst prospects on recovery. They are less
likely to mature out of their addiction [20, 21], they tend
to have worse treatment outcomes. The addictionmakes it
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harder to treat the mental illness, while the mental illness
makes it harder to treat the addiction, and on top of that,
the substance aggravates the mental health problems [22].
However, by sketching a broader picture of a develop-
mental trajectory rather than focussing narrowly on men-
tal illness, Lewis gives a more hopeful message for treat-
ment. ‘Addiction need be no more than a stage in the
development of the self. And that often seems to be
exactly what it is.’ [1, p.215]. Addiction is not in itself
the problem, addiction is just an extension of ‘a develop-
mental pattern already set in motion’ [1, p. 36], and can be
overcome by overcoming problems of the self.
Lewis’s intuition that the normative message of the
disease model is detrimental to recovery seems also to
be backed up by research. One study demonstrated that
people who support the disease model are less likely to
recover [23].6 However, this is the point I would like to
explore further. If Lewis’s social goal is to improve
recovery, does he help people best by explicitly rejecting
the disease model? I see the benefit of promoting agency
for recovery, a strategy that Pickard has also outlined
[24], however, I wonder how this agency can best be
promoted. Lewis is puzzled by the response he got from
one of his readers:
But what reallymoves me is the addicts who get in
touch and say, ‘Don’t take this away from me. If
you take away the disease label, then basically I
won’t be able to get better, if you don’t let me
understand myself as having a disease.’ It’s a very
strange argument, to have to think of yourself as
having a disease because that’s the only way you
can live with yourself and deal with the addiction.
And then I feel badly, because I don’t want to
harm these people or take away something that
they need conceptually or motivationally. (…)
They feel that if it is a disease, they don’t have
to feel that burden or shame, because it’s not their
fault. It’s hard to pull the rug out from under that
without causing some upset. [25]
I will explore this objection to Lewis’s account in two
ways. Firstly I will argue that Lewis can prevent these
kinds of objections by specifying which normative
claims of the disease model he mainly objects to, instead
of broadly stating that addiction is not a disease. Sec-
ondly I will argue that the Lewis model of addiction and
recovery would have been stronger if he did not engage
with the disease discussion. Although Lewis explicitly
objects to the dichotomy that addiction is either a dis-
ease or a choice, by so strongly objecting the disease
model, he risks staying trapped in the dichotomy, and
his model being mistaken for a simple choice model. I
will argue that both a disease model and a simple choice
model of addiction are detrimental to recovery. I will
suggest a third way in which we can look at agency in
addiction inspired by research on belief in self-efficacy.
What Does It Mean to Call Addiction a Disease?
Whether it is beneficial to recovery or not to adopt the
disease model all depends on which normative claims of
the disease model we adopt. Adopting a disease view on
addiction does not necessarily mean that one adopts an
overly pessimistic view on their agency. In my qualitative
follow-up research among 69 alcohol and opioid depen-
dent people, I asked them several questions on how they
perceived their agency, and one of my questions was
whether they thought addiction was a disease.7 In the first
year the majority (68%) stated that addiction was indeed a
disease. Only 13% of the people explicitly stated that
addiction was not a disease and 19% were ambivalent.
The second year we decided to slightly rephrase the
question to: ‘Some people say that addiction is a (brain)
disease, others claim that it is a choice. What do you
think?’ Suddenly respondents expressed much more am-
bivalence about the disease concept: 55% said that it was
both a choice and a disease, 32% stated it was a disease,
10% claimed it was a choice, and 3% didn’t know.
There are several explanations for this shift. The first
year I recruited about half of my sample in a detox
facility (the other half of the sample was recruited from
a maintenance treatment program). So half of the re-
spondents might have been at a stage in which they felt
they had very little control over their substance use. This
finding could mean that people seek treatment when
they think their addiction is a disease.
However, another explanation is that addicted
people who endorsed the disease model didn’t think
that they had any choice left. So when we slightly
rephrased the question, people expressed this view
more easily. So what do addicted people mean when
6 Although one can also turn this around and argue that people who fail
to recover are more likely to support the disease model. 7 For details on the study methodology, see [31].
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they say addiction is a disease? Which aspects of the
disease model do they find beneficial?
The disease label emphasised for them the involun-
tariness of their condition.
If a disease is something you don’t want that
you’ve got and that ruins your life, you know it
is in a way… (R67)
However, the type of disease emphasised by study
participants was interesting. It was remarkable that al-
though in the first round of interviews many people
supported the disease label, only three people saw it as a
brain disease. The most common answer was that addic-
tion is a hereditable disease, many respondents had par-
ents or siblings who also struggled with addiction.
The disease model was also used to describe why
they were different from other people, why they found it
hard to just drink a limited amount, or just binge one
day, like their friends.
Another reason why people supported the disease
model was because they found it very hard to overcome
their addiction. As a response to their loved ones, who
often advocated a ‘just say no’-technique, the disease
label fitted their experiences better:
I’m not too sure. It’s controversial. Some people ...
like my parents don’t think that, they just think ‘oh
get over it and stop’ but I think I can’t, but a lot of
people do think it’s a disease but I don’t know. I
don’t know. I’m not too sure. (R45)
my mum and dad thinks that it’s a choice you
know so that’s why they’re pushing me away
and thinking you know I’m choosing drugs over
my son and my family when I’ve had a good life
and I have you know I haven’t really got an excuse
to use. (R57C)
Although most people are ambivalent about whether
or not they have a disease, the disease label offers them
protection from the simple choice models that their
loved ones sometimes support. So when my respon-
dents claim that addiction is a disease, they do not claim
that they have no choice left due to how addiction
changed their brains, they claim that they did not choose
to become addicted, and that their condition is not easy
to overcome. If Lewis had specified which normative
claims of the disease model he objects to, maybe most
addicted people who support the disease label for
strategic reasons would have found that their view does
not differ that much from Lewis’s.
When Lewis objects to the disease model he mostly
seems to object to the normative claim that addiction is
caused by something outside the agent, a dysfunction in
the brain, and that the solution also lies external to the
agent: in changing the brain through medicines. Instead
of saying addiction is not a disease, Lewis should say:
addiction is not a chronic, relapsing brain disease that
can only be cured by an outsider with medicine. Lewis
does not object to the idea that addictive behaviour can
be compulsive; he objects to the idea that compulsion is
carved in stone. It is especially this normative claim of
the disease model that Lewis objects to because he
thinks it will hinder recovery. Lewis thinks that in re-
storing one’s sense of self-efficacy, people can make
important steps in recovery. He is afraid that the BDMA
results in people underestimating their self-efficacy.
Next I will argue that there is also a risk in
overestimating one’s belief in self-efficacy, and that this
is also detrimental to recovery. If Lewis had steered
away from the whole dichotomy between choice and
disease, his model would have been more nuanced.
Addiction and Belief in Self-Efficacy
For people to try to change their situation, they have to
believe that they are able to change it. They have to
believe in their self-efficacy. Lewis is afraid that the
BDMA hinders this belief in self-efficacy. However,
not only underestimating our belief in self-efficacy can
be detrimental to our recovery; overestimating it can as
well. Belief in self-efficacy is often seen as a static
condition that an individual can choose to have [26,
27]. As Bandura shows, however, belief in self-
efficacy can be constructed or undermined through cer-
tain experiences [28]. For example performances: when
we experience success it enforces our belief in self-
efficacy, while failure diminishes it. So there is a risk
that when we spark addicted people’s belief in self-
efficacy, but they subsequently fail to control their use,
they feel even more demoralised than before. A sense of
shame and guilt on top of that will further fuel the
addiction [29]. It is interesting that relapse hardly plays
a role in Lewis’s case studies. As Huges argues: ‘The
most important aspect to smoking cessation is maintain-
ing the motivation to make multiple attempts’ [30].
People need several attempts to overcome their
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addiction because their agency needs to be restored on
several levels. They simultaneously need to target the
causes, reasons, and self-concepts that motivate their
addictive behaviour. They will need a range of strategies
to overcome their addiction [31], and this will take time.
So when we tell people that they can overcome their
addiction, we also need to tell them that it will be hard.
When I plan to climb the Mount Everest, I first
need to believe that I can do it. It helps when people
support me and tell me that they believe I can do it.
But it is equally important that I am prepared for the
hardship I will encounter and know some strategies
for overcoming the hardship. We do want to appeal to
people’s sense of agency, and motivate them to use
what is left of it, however, we want to acknowledge
as well that their agency is limited. In order to restore
self-efficacy, we need to simultaneously point out
that people are able to overcome their addiction and
that this will be hard. Although most theories ac-
knowledge both sides, there seems to be a tendency
to focus on either control or control reducing factors.
Lewis does this as well. If he would have just titled
his book ‘the neurobiology of recovery’, it would
have been a much stronger account. Although
Lewis’s model is quite elaborate on why it is so hard
to overcome addiction, by stating so strongly that
addiction is not a disease, his model can be easily
mistaken for a simple choice model. By so vigorous-
ly objecting to the disease model of addiction he
distracts from what the main focus should be: giving
people a balanced view on how their agency is di-
minished in addiction, and how they can overcome it.
As Berridge argued, overcoming addiction requires a
special act of personal agency [32]. Lewis made a
valuable attempt to show what this act of agency could
look like, however, there is still quite a lot of work to do
in this regard. Lewis might be too optimistic about the
possibilities of narrative agency and identity change.
Lewis himself already outlines how hard it is to adopt
a narrative approach in addiction because in addiction
we lose a linear sense of time, as we are trapped in the
now-appeal substances reinforce. In addition, the litera-
ture on the role of identity in the recovery from addic-
tion, show that for some people it is easier than for
others to overcome addiction through the motivational
force of their identity [8, 35, 36]. In order to change our
story and self-concept, we need to have identity mate-
rials. Some people might have more identity materials
than others, because their addiction use started later, was
less devastating to their identity, or because they are
from more supportive backgrounds [8].
Towards a Model of Addiction that Supports
Recovery
People struggling with addiction are neither powerless
over their addiction, nor are they fully in control [33]. I
argued that what would help their recovery best is amodel
that acknowledges both their agential capacities, as well as
the challenges imposed on their agency. But how can we
do this within the current dichotomy of choice-or-disease?
We are almost forced to choose sides and to either focus
on loss of control in addiction, or claim that addicted
people have agency they can use. How can we fairly
acknowledge both addicted people’s experiences of pow-
erlessness and their experiences of agency?
When I look closer at the life stories of the addicted
persons I interviewed, two things stood out. Throughout
their using careers, they showedmany instances of agency
and control over their substance use. Many people were
addicted for years, and in these years they showed a
variety of control over their use. Some people would use
substances recreationally for years before they became
addicted. Others plunged into a desperate addiction
straight away, but would, over the years, find ways in
which they could use with more control. For instance,
they would do this by changing their substance of choice,
or setting personal rules for themselves. Others would
control their use for several weeks, months, or years,
and then fall into a binge for a similar period of time.
There was not a simple answer to whether or not people
had control. They had control to a certain extent, or in a
certain situation, or in a certain phase of their lives. But
many people described one or several periods in their
lives in which they were totally out of control, in which
their behaviour utterly bewildered them. I would like to
call this the disease stage of addiction. But this disease
stage was just a stage, surrounded by stages in which
people had full or partial control over their use.
So although addiction is not a disease, there can be a
disease stage in addiction. To call it a disease stage
emphasises that this condition may pass, that it is not
carved in stone. However, it also acknowledges that
there is a stage in addiction in which it is utterly hard
to exercise self-control. In this formulation ‘disease’
refers to addictive behaviour being largely impervious
both to the agent’s values and to available techniques of
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self-control [34]. A disease stage does not indicate that
agency is completely lost, but that it is very much harder
to exercise agency at that stage.
There are several reasons to call this stage a disease
stage, however, I will also propose an alternative that
might be more conceptually correct. The word ‘disease’
reflects the intuitions of most addicted and lay people:
that it is a condition someone does not want, and that
this condition is harmful. Using the words ‘disease
stage’ shows a compromise to the disease model, rather
than rejecting the model all together. However, the word
‘disease’ is associated with a physiological cause of the
condition. In so far as neurobiological changes cause the
automatic addictive behaviour, the word ‘disease’might
be right. However, as Lewis and many others have
argued, there are many other causes of addiction: psy-
chological, environmental, and so on.
Although the disease stage is characterised by neuro-
scientific mechanisms becoming dysfunctional, other
issues could have preceded this strong physical depen-
dency: a developmental issue, a sociological issue, or a
genetic vulnerability. Although the addicted behaviour
at that moment is strongly motivated by a neurological
dysfunction, this does not mean that the only treatment
lies in the neurological realm. In this sense it can be
misleading to still use the word disease.
So what are the alternatives to the label ‘disease stage’?
In his book Lewis briefly refers to a compulsive stage of
addiction. However, compulsion might be too strong
because it is associated with a total lack of agency. Lewis
defines addiction as habitual behaviour, however, to speak
of ‘a habitual stage’ might be too weak, since, as Lewis
argues, it is a very relentless, destructive, layered habit.
Pickard once suggested that although addiction is a
choice, it is often a choice made under duress [35].
Watson has made a similar plea [36]. He defines duress
as the agent being ‘subject to coercive circumstances
sufficient to compromise her capacity for self-control. It
shouldn’t matter whether these circumstances result from
human design or natural forces’ (p. 613). He distinguishes
this from legal duress: ‘To be addicted (on our assump-
tions) is to be disposed, perhaps episodically, to volitional
impairment under certain circumstances, whereas in the
standard case, the duress is a one-shot deal’ (p. 615).
Watson proposes, inspired by Morse, a plea of ‘guilty
but partially responsible’, Pickard argues for a concept
of ‘responsibility without blame’. These concepts simul-
taneously emphasise that people have agency and that
their agency is compromised.
Using the word ‘duress’ would also have my prefer-
ence. Instead of calling addiction a disease, we can state
that addiction has a duress stage, in which the addictive
behaviour is largely impervious to the agent’s values
and to available techniques of self-control. However, the
agent can overcome this stage by developing new tech-
niques of self-control, by building on their self-concept
and belief in self-efficacy, by changing their environ-
ments and habits, and by engaging in projects that are
meaningful to them. As one of the respondents stated:
I think it is definitely a disease but it can become a
choice. You can choose to not have the disease, do
you know what I mean? (…) You can get to a
point where you can choose not to be diseased
anymore but it definitely is a disease. It’s like a
really bad flu that you know you have to fight off.
(…) You can choose to fight it off just by becom-
ing healthier and making smarter decisions. Like
instead of going out in the wet and rain without a
raincoat you wouldn’t do that to get sick, (chuck-
ling), just doing smarter things, yeah. (R40C)
In this duress state of addiction people need elaborate
acts of personal agency to overcome their addiction.
They need to believe in their self-efficacy, but they need
to develop multiple strategies as well. They probably
need several attempts, and some outside support, before
they master it.
Conclusion
Lewis’s work offers us a very much to be welcomed
neurobiology of recovery. It offers addicted people a
hopeful and respectful narrative for their recovery that
treats them as agents rather than as damaged brains.
However, his account would have been stronger if he
would not have been seduced to take a position in the
disease dichotomy. He now risks emphasising people’s
own choice and narrative agency too much.
I argued that restoring people’s sense of self-efficacy
needs more than just telling that they can do it because
they do not have a disease. They need to experience
success as well in their attempts. They need to be
realistic about the hardships they will encounter, and
how they can overcome them. I argued that the narrative
recovery might be hard to achieve for some people.
Snoek A.
I propose replacing the notions of addiction as a
disease or addiction at a choice with the notion that
some addictions know a duress-like stage. This is a stage
at which it is hard for people to exercise their self-
control, but during which their agency is only tempo-
rarily compromised. It is also a stage that can be over-
come, step by step, and probably after several attempts.
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